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How can research into film policy inform us about the nature of power and cultural politics regarding 
film censorship? How does censorship affect the aesthetics and identity of film-making produced under 
political and market constraints? Focusing on the geopolitical regions of British Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
China, this article delineates the impact of British colonial film censorship and the politics of cinematically 
representing revolutionary China during the Cold War. It reveals that British Hong Kong censors 
changed their strategy in the 1970s and 80s from suppressing mainland Chinese films to inhibiting films 
that might offend China from screening in Hong Kong. The evidence points to a distinctive picture of 
transregional smuggling and cinematic boundary-crossing, namely, the dangerous trafficking and 
interception of movie images, ideologies, and propaganda. Film screening of ‘China’ in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan was subject to strict official surveillance to quarantine undesirable public visuality and political 
discourses. The study examines film’s ambiguous expressions of China and Chineseness as it constantly 
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This article delineates the impact of British colonial film censorship and the politics 
of representing revolutionary China in cinema during the Cold War in Hong Kong.
 1
  
Adopting an archive-based cultural-historical approach, this study reveals that British 
Hong Kong censors changed their strategy in the 1970s and 80s from suppressing 
mainland Chinese films to inhibiting films that might offend China from screening in 
the colony. In 1974, Hong Kong independent woman film-maker Tang Shu-shuen 唐
書璇 made Zaijian Zhongguo  再見中國 (China Behind), which depicted four Chi-
nese students fleeing into Hong Kong during the Cultural Revolution. The film was 
banned when it met mounting attacks by pro-communist newspapers. In 1981, Taiwan 
director Bai Jingrui 白景瑞 released Huangtian houtu 皇天后土 (The Coldest Winter 
in Peking), a film about the atrocities of the Gang of Four during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. The film was screened for only one day in Hong Kong when it was abruptly 
withdrawn from public viewing. The Hong Kong government banned the film because 
it contained “political propaganda”, and screening the film would run the risk of “dam-
aging good relations with other territories” (“Film Censorship” 1980–1983). Another 
Taiwanese production, Wang Tong’s 王童 Jiaru woshi zhende 假如我是眞的 (If I 
Were for Real), was rejected in the same year. Telling the story of how a young man 
extorted a fortune by claiming to be a son of a Chinese general, colonial authorities 
prohibited the film from screening because it was “likely to be used as propaganda” 
and was “not in the best interests of Hong Kong” (“Film Censorship” 1981–1982).  
How can research into film policy inform us about the nature of colonial power re-
garding film censorship? Focusing on the shifting geopolitical and diplomatic relation-
ships of Hong Kong and Taiwan, Britain and the PRC, I delineate a picture to show 
how Cold War tactics and colonial censorship affected the production, circulation, 
reception, and imagination of films in the circuit of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China 
during the 1970s and 1980s. This study maps out a distinctive picture of transregional 
smuggling and cinematic underflows, namely, the dangerous trafficking and intercep-
tion of movie images, ideologies, and propaganda. Cinematic projections of ‘China’ in 
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Hong Kong and Taiwan were subject to strict official surveillance to quarantine unde-
sirable visuality and political disputes from the public.  
In facing both Chinese national politics and global Cold War stratagems, the Hong 
Kong government tactfully maintained neutrality between the PRC and the ROC, ad-
justing its film censorship policy to evolving political circumstances to target com-
munist or anti-communist films at different times. What is really at issue is not only 
British colonial film policy but also Cold War geopolitics in the Asian front. The 
changing diplomatic relationships of London and Hong Kong with China and Taiwan 
are pivotal when it comes to understanding the cultural and political frictions generated 
from controversial Taiwan-related movies and images. Based on press coverage, his-
torical accounts, and declassified documents, the study reveals a high level of anxiety 
felt by colonial administrators about the turmoil provoked by the Cultural Revolution 
in China. 
This period witnessed the rise of Hong Kong as a vibrant center of film production 
and entertainment business particularly for the Southeast Asian regions, yet the impact 
of the global Cold War on the cinematic economy and expressions in Hong Kong is 
seriously understudied. Perusing the multi-archival materials and reading them be-
tween the lines against the responses of film-makers and the viewing publics, I venture 
to illuminate the identity politics of the Hong Kong people as it was mediated through 
the colonial film policy changes. How did censorship affect and interact with the aes-
thetics and identity of film-making produced under political and market constraints? 
What did the Cold War geopolitics mean to the citizen audience and how was this 
manifested? The study examines film’s ambiguous expressions of China and Chinese-
ness as it constantly negotiated the factors of colonialism, Chinese nationalism, and 
Cold War transnational politics. It calls for a dynamic cultural-artistic approach to 
probe the ambiguous interplay of state ideology, film policy, film form, and audience 
reception to ponder how filmmakers and audiences could get around the legal appa-
ratus of censorship to engage in the alternative discourses of political freedom and the 
right to the truth.  
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Film Censorship and Cold War Hong Kong Geopolitics 
Cinema, as a form of compelling storytelling and spectacle, has been historically sub-
ject to the manipulation of the state and cultural agents to shape the identity and ide-
ology of a place and its people. Regarding colonial film censorship, British 
governments directly exercised censorship authority in their colonies in India and Af-
rica (Chowdhry 2000; Vasudev 1978; Burns 2002). In Hong Kong, before the Japa-
nese occupaton of the city in 1941, the authority of censorship was assigned to the 
police in order to maintain public order and eliminate undersirable representations 
on screen perceived to be harmful to the native Chinese population (Newman 2013, 
167). The draconian measures of cultural control were diametrically different from 
what Western regimes did in their homelands, as Britain (Trevelyan 1973) and Amer-
ica (Randall 1968; Doherty 1999; Grieveson 2004) had unofficial censoring bodies 
formed by the industries themselves, but they did not have any legal powers to enforce 
or regulate. 
Since the late 1940s, with the onset of the Cold War, British Hong Kong had been 
turned into a battleground between the Communists and the Guomindang on political 
and cultural fronts. The cinema became a vital arena for the combat for hearts and 
minds. Colonial authorities secretively practised film censorship to contain Chinese 
nationalist and communist propaganda on screen to avoid political turmoil in Hong 
Kong. In 1953 the government issued the Film Censorship Regulations after the Brit-
ish suppressed communism in the Federation of Malaya in 1952 — a time that coin-
cided with the end of the Korean War. The 1953 Regulations reserved official power 
for the government to exercise censorship in secrecy. The colonial administration 
tightened its grip on film inspection to curb communist propaganda and leftwing film 
activities as many influential filmmakers fled to Hong Kong from the mainland after 
the war (Barbieri 1997, 77–78). Yet the regulations, while granting limitless power to 
official censors, provided only guidelines for the manner of censorship, but not pre-
scriptions of legal rights upon which films should be censored. The colonial film cen-
sorship system had been operating without legal authority (Ching 1987). The 
clandestine censorship reveals the nature of British Hong Kong rule and policy toward 
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cinema and mass culture, in which colonial officials diplomatically dealt with interna-
tional politics and big powers through intervening in the distribution and exhibition of 
film and public visuality at large. 
The historical trajectory manifests the shifting stance of British colonial authorities in 
exercising censorship behind the Hong Kong film scene. It showcases British-style 
pragmatism in handling the exhibition of mainland films and the representation of 
China in films in the colony. The film censorship policy has to be contextualised in 
order to make it meaningful to the cultural Cold War in East Asia.  
British global power declined substantially after WWII. Asia, except for the defence 
of Malaya and Singapore, became peripheral to British foreign policymakers. Britain’s 
early recognition of the PRC in 1950 was only a pragmatic approach to preserving 
British economic interests in the mainland and Hong Kong. Whereas economic in-
terests dominated Britain’s foreign diplomacy in dealing with China and Taiwan, the 
colonial power had to maintain its special relationship with the U.S., which was pursu-
ing a proactive policy of containment against China. The British were never concerned 
about the unification or division of China, nor did they intend to produce a two-China 
situation. The China issue mattered to them only when it had wider implications for 
regional peace and security (Tsang 2006, 196). 
In 1958 Mao Zedong triggered a new Taiwan Straits crisis when the PRC troops 
shelled the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Britain formed a de facto, albeit 
temporary, strategic partnership with Taiwan to support the U.S. without promising to 
provide further military aid to defend Taiwan. Steve Tsang (2006) contends that Brit-
ain and the ROC constituted the “Cold War’s odd couple”. British officials were keen 
to retain commercial links and an informal diplomatic relationship with Taiwan 
through Hong Kong, yet British officials believed that Taiwanese sovereignty under 
the Guomindang regime was shaky. Britain opposed any possibility of a ‘Two China’ 
solution. To London, the crucial issue was to prevent the Taiwan question from trig-
gering a war in East Asia, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950. 
Britain and the ROC had become “unwitting partners” by the late 1950s in pursuit of 
their respective goals (Tsang 1994, 105–6).  
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As the geopolitical conflict between the PRC and Taiwan escalated in 1958, Hong 
Kong censors toughened their policy on PRC films while they showed favouritism 
toward Taiwan films. Taiwanese documentaries Jinri baodao – Taiwan 今日寶島－
台灣 (Today’s Taiwan) and Ziyou zhenxian zhi sheng 自由陣線之聲 (Voice from the 
Free World) were passed for screening, but the mainland documentary Ode to the 
Motherland was banned in Hong Kong. The two Taiwanese documentaries should 
not have been passed because they contained shots of pictures of Chiang Kai-shek, the 
Nationalist flag, and the slogan “Fangong dalu” 反攻大陸 (“Reclaim the Mainland”). 
The existing Panel’s criterion censored from films all shots of Chinese leaders, politi-
cal rallies, and national flags regardless of their Nationalist or Communist affiliation. 
It was on the same criterion that the mainland Chinese documentary on the 1957 
National Day celebrations in Beijing was banned, for it included shots of the PRC 
national flag and leaders (Du 2017, 127).  
Hong Kong censors’ preferential decisions on Taiwan propaganda over the PRC 
counterpart engendered vehement protests from the local communist press and insti-
tutions in August and September 1958. The New China News Agency and Southern 
Film Corporation (the distributor of PRC films in Hong Kong) condemned the Hong 
Kong government for clandestinely exercising a “two-Chinas plot” through film cen-
sorship. Allowing national icons to be seen on screen could be interpreted as recog-
nising Taiwan’s status as an independent nation. Even the leftist movie celebrity Xia 
Meng 夏夢 had to toe the party line to accuse the Hong Kong government of plotting 
a “two-Chinas conspiracy” (Lee 2013, 29). Du (2017) relates the Hong Kong authori-
ties’ bias toward Taiwanese over PRC films to the Taiwan Straits crisis, when Britain 
unwittingly forged an informal strategic partnership with the ROC to support the 
United States (129). The timing of Britain’s foreign and diplomatic cultural manoeuver 
could not be more apposite. Britain sought to maintain a balance of power without 
committing its military forces to Taiwan’s defence. It was therefore expedient for Hong 
Kong’s colonial censors to express diplomatic support for Taiwan on the cultural front. 
Beside the factor of the immediate geopolitical conflict, indeed, the colonial authori-
ties’ harsh measures against mainland propaganda stemmed from their fear of com-
munist influence in Hong Kong in the volatile 1950s.     
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Nonetheless, British Hong Kong censors changed their strategy of political censorship 
from the mid-1960s, from prohibiting mainland Chinese films to banning films that 
might offend China from being screened in Hong Kong. Zardas Lee (2013) suggests 
that after the mid-1960s, censors tended not to treat the Nationalist government in 
Taiwan in a positive light as they did with the United States and Chinese governments. 
And colonial officials resolved to protect the images of America and other friendly 
countries. “The communists’ demand for keeping scenes and commentary that de-
meaned the United States, Britain and its allies was hardly acceptable to the Hong 
Kong government” (54). Since the late 1960s, Lee indicates, “Hong Kong had been 
banning Taiwan films that referred to Chinese communists as “bandits”, but allowing 
Chinese films that demeaned Chiang Kai-shek in the same way. The government pro-
tected Chinese films and also China’s image” (102–3). The British Hong Kong au-
thorities were evidently distancing themselves from the government of Taiwan and 
becoming friendlier with that of the PRC.  
British Hong Kong’s tendency to disfavour Taiwan-related movies had much to do 
with Britain’s diplomatic gesture to develop its “friendly relations” with China in spite 
of the propagandistic rhetoric of anti-communism and ideology characteristic of the 
Western bloc. The political goals of improving Sino-British relations and lessening 
Cold War conflicts in East Asia dictated the political censorship of PRC films in Hong 
Kong. Different from the American policy of containment and military threat, Britain 
opted for compromise and the PRC’s admission to the United Nations. The British 
efforts to establish full diplomatic relations with China were, however, complicated by 
the success of Sino-American rapproachement with Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 
1971 (Mark 2017, 162).  
Even before the U.S. established diplomatic relations with the PRC in the 1970s, Brit-
ain was confident in developing normal diplomatic relations with China despite the 
Vietnam War and the 1967 riots (Lee 2013, 102–3). In film censorship, Hong Kong 
officials pragmatically kept on revising their internal censorship regulations to soften 
their position against PRC films. The 1960s guidelines indicated a more lenient atti-
tude toward political subjects in films with certain constraints. The Film Censorship 
Board of Review stipulated in “A Statement of the General Principles” (1965) that “no 
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film should be banned simply because it is political in nature or has propaganda for 
the sole or main purpose,” on condition that “its showing in public to any audience 
likely to include political opponents would not cause a breach of the peace, would not 
on its own inspire individuals or small groups to organise seditions or subversive un-
derground bodies in their places of work, schools, etc.” Censors were advised to adopt 
more tolerant directives, stipulating that “films purporting to eulogise life or conditions 
in other countries or under other regimes should be passed for public showing, pro-
vided they do not include offensive attacks on other governments or national leaders 
or on other people’s ways of life, or make derogatory comparisons.” Yet, censors were 
cautioned to “bear in mind particular sensitivities on both sides of the camp to implied 
recognition of ‘Two Chinas’”.    
The “Annual Report on Film Censorship” (1970) mentioned that nine films from 
Taiwan (features and shorts) were submitted for censorship for the event of a Taiwan 
“Mandarin Film Week” held at the City Hall in June. “Four of them were approved, 
while three were cut and two were banned for excessive military significance.” By con-
trast, eight films from mainland China were submitted for censorship, and all were 
approved. These mainland films included some documentaries (four about the “9
th
 
National Congress” and one on the completion of the “Nanking Bridge” as well as 
potentially militant films (two about the Sino-Soviet border clash under the general 
title “New Tsar,” and a war drama about guerrilla activities in Japanese occupied ter-
ritory).         
In the years 1965–1974, 34 films (out of 357 banned movies) were excluded on polit-
ical grounds. These controversial political films came from countries including China, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Israel, the United States, Can-
ada, Britain, and France. In 1973–1987, 21 films (out of 8,400 films submitted) were 
banned on political grounds: eight from Taiwan, three each from Hong Kong and 
Vietnam, two from China, and one each from North Korea, the United States, France, 
Japan, and Italy (Pomery 1988, 79). The archival evidence shows that the Hong Kong 
government was alert to films that might offend China or depict China in an unfavour-
able light. Films depicting the recent political event of the Cultural Revolution and 
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those produced by Taiwan with anti-communist themes attracted repeated interfer-
ence from Chinese representatives in Hong Kong.  
The shifting criteria of censorship in the 1960s and 70s show us the expedient nature 
of colonial manipulation of the policy after considering the regional geopolitics and 
the local Hong Kong situation. By the late 1960s the British share of world commerce 
was declining. As Malaysia and Singapore were de-colonised and became sovereign 
and independent states, Hong Kong remained Britain’s only military outpost in East 
Asia. At the same time, the postwar period saw the coming-of-age of the locally born 
post-war generation who had benefited from the city’s rapid economic development 
and improved living conditions in housing, education, and social welfare. By the 1970s 
the colony had been turned into a service hub with global links to the U.S., Japan, and 
Asian countries. The flourishing therein of popular culture based on the Cantonese 
vernacular reflected a confident sense of local identity as well as the cosmopolitan 
outlook of the young. The Chinese identity that most Hong Kong people subscribed 
to was a “complex and convoluted one”, as Steve Tsang (2004) notes, for “being Chi-
nese in Hong Kong was primarily an ethnic and cultural affiliation and generally did 
not mean being a Chinese citizen or national of the PRC” (195). The traumatic dis-
turbance of 1967, as a spillover from the Cultural Revolution that could have posed a 
serious challenge to the colony’s governance and social stability, had proved to be a 
historical turning point for an emerging Hong Kong identity. Whereas most local 
young residents were critical of the colonial government in the era that saw the rise of 
the civil rights movement and decolonisation worldwide, they were equally distancing 
themselves from the PRC, especially when China was plunging into the chaos of the 
Cultural Revolution.  
The socio-economic and cultural transformations of Hong Kong would have contrib-
uted to a shift in the attitude of colonial officials towards relaxing censorship of PRC 
films from the mid-1960s as they observed the Hong Kong audience’s general antipa-
thy to political films and propaganda. In 1970, the government noticed that communist 
films had very restricted outlets in Hong Kong and were seldom seen by a wide un-
committed audience (Director of Information Service 1970). This assessment of the 
unpopularity of PRC productions could have been a reason for officials to ease control 
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on mainland films. During the Cultural Revolution the Southern Film Corporation 
was allowed to show some propaganda films in Hong Kong (Xu 2005, 231–35). Not 
surprisingly, communist movies had already lost their appeal to Hong Kong movie-
goers. At the same time, colonial officials did not want to infuriate local leftist radicals 
by severely limiting their films, especially after the 1967 riots in Hong Kong (Ng 2008, 
29).  
The government’s tendency to approve more PRC films for screening in the colony 
can be seen in the reports by the Panel of Censors. The Chief Film Censor William 
Hung (1972) stated  that “political films from China Mainland have showed a contin-
ued increase” with eleven films submitted for censorship (two Korean War films, four 
documentaries, three stage operas, one ballet, and one ping-pong-game film), which 
were all approved for exhibition. The Southern Film Corporation distributed a num-
ber of political films—six from North Vietnam and four from North Korea—which 
were all approved. Four films were submitted from Taiwan by Hong Kong and Kow-
loon Cinema and Theatrical Entertainment Free General Association. The films had 
little political interest as they were intended for exhibition in a “Mandarin Film Week” 
held at Caritas Social Centre on December 9–12. However, the Board still banned 
two of them.  
While the film censors were instructed to filter out mainland pictures glorifying Mao 
Zedong or displaying communist military might, they were vigilant about excluding 
Taiwan and English-speaking films with derogatory remarks on mainland China or 
Chinese leaders. Taiwan films submitted for censorship in 1979 were mostly sword-
plays, love stories, and domestic dramas. But one Taiwan film that made reference to 
a “commune” and “refugees” was cut with consent (Hung 1971). Hung (1970) warned 
that some U.S. films in the late 1960s had a fashion of “inserting into films some scenes 
or remarks about Red China, Red Guards, Mao Tse-tung, etc.” Although these dia-
logues or commentaries were meant to be jokes or amusing remarks mostly in jest, the 
censors should realise the risk of approving such jesting scenes or remarks as they were 
likely to be misunderstood or become offensive to those lacking a sense of humour.    
Ng: Screening without China                                                                                        171 
 
 
The control over provocative non-PRC film materials could be seen as a pragmatic 
strategy adopted by Hong Kong censors to scale down local leftist pressures. The left-
wing press in Hong Kong and the Southern Film Corporation had been more vocif-
erous than their Taiwan counterparts in accusing the government of discriminating 
against PRC films through film censorship. That colonial censors gave PRC films more 
lenient treatment toward the 1970s manifested the Cold War factor in Sino-British 
diplomacy, in which Britain continued to develop a ‘friendly’ relationship with the 
PRC. Another aspect that needs addressing is the local politics of film censorship. As 
the panel’s reports subtly suggested, under British command Hong Kong officials 
could maintain a significant degree of agency and autonomy by making expedient di-
rectives to force off screen materials that might offend China. Observing that didactic 
political films had lost the favour of local middle-class movie-goers, moreover, they 
tended not to impose rigid control on communist films so as to avert imminent polit-
ical agitation from local left-wingers.  
Through manipulating the censorship rules, the colonial government hoped to shape 
Hong Kong’s audiences and citizens to be politically apathetic towards Chinese politics 
and contemporary history. How does censorship affect the aesthetics and identity of 
local film-making produced under political constraints? How did Cold War cultural 
politics interfere in the Hong Kong film scene in the transnational exchange with Tai-
wan and the PRC? I highlight some remarkable local and Taiwan-related film produc-
tions in the 1970s and 80s that became controversial censorship cases, and explore 
how the Cultural Revolution figured as a living event and lived memories on screen. 
 
Politics of Art and Identity: China Behind  
In 1974, Hong Kong woman producer-director Cecille Tang Shu-shuen made China 
Behind, a.k.a. Ben奔 (The Dissidents). Set in 1966 at the advent of the Cultural Rev-
olution, the film tells of the agony of four Guangzhou students who attempt to flee 
China to Hong Kong. This independent film follows the escapees from China, who 
struggle to sneak into the colony by land only to find life not as rosy as they expected. 
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Painting a bleak portrait of Chinese society as it did, the film was equally critical of the 
materialistic city of colonial Hong Kong.  
China Behind was submitted to the Panel of Film Censors in October 1974. Local 
leftists denounced the film as being “anti-China” and “counter-revolutionary.” Their 
mounting attacks forced Tang to withdraw the film from screening. The film was re-
submitted to the censors in December, and was again rejected for public screening. 
Pierre Lebrun, the Chief Film Censor, explained the ban was imposed because the 
film “contains certain materials which are believed to be damaging to the good rela-
tionship between Hong Kong and another territory” (“Censors Ban Film on China”). 
Tang’s decision to withdraw it was made in view of the “unfavorable reaction from 
local left-wing groups.” Tang expressed an apolitical viewpoint in gesture by emphasis-
ing the film as “a work of art”, while she did not want to “spark off any sort of political 
row” (Chu 1974). Behind the scenes, however, the film-maker would have been aware 
that covert negotiations and collusions were in place between the colonial government 
and representatives of the PRC in Hong Kong. The Xinhua News Agency in Hong 
Kong invited the director over for a “chat” about China Behind after the film had been 
submitted for censorship. Xinhua was curious to know the source of funding or if it 
was from the camp of “Soviet Revisionism.” The PRC representatives asked Tang for 
a copy of the film to preview before it could ever make it for public screening (Yau 
2015, 166).   
The ban on China Behind in 1975 continued until 1980, when the political advisor 
recommended that the Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA) 
clear the film for private cinema-club showings. Indeed, the local prohibition of China 
Behind throughout the 1970s would have had to do as much with the Cultural Revo-
lution as with the escalating Vietnam War and the impact of Vietnamese refugees es-
caping to the colony. The film about the mainland dissidents in their exilic journey to 
Hong Kong could have resonated with a picture of hundreds of thousands of Viet-
namese boat-people, driven by the fear of the new communist leadership after the war, 
fleeing to a safer refuge in Hong Kong. Colonial officials had to take the external po-
litical situation into consideration when they assessed the possibility of releasing the 
film for public viewing.  
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China Behind was permitted for general viewing in 1981. By that time public memo-
ries of the Cultural Revolution and refugees had waned in Hong Kong. The film was 
shown only in a local film society in March as the film’s distributor D&B Studio as-
sessed that “the film would have failed commercially” (Stoner 1987). The film’s dis-
tributor D&B Studio decided to resubmit the film in 1987 to challenge the current 
film censorship system. It was approved for showing on the commercial cinema circuit 
in May 1987.  
The film’s production context of Taiwan infuriated left-wing opponents in Hong Kong, 
who accused it of being a propagandist film from Taiwan, an “effort of a small Chiang 
clique to tarnish the achievements of the Cultural Revolution” (Chu 1974). Ironically, 
Tang’s crew did the shooting illegally in Taiwan as they smuggled props like the five-
star red flags, Mao statues and Little Red Books (Chairman Mao’s Quotations), and 
revolutionary-era costumes into the land which was still under the reign of the White 
Terror (Lei 2016; Sa 2012). The film production could not be done in the mainland 
as the Gang of Four was still in power. 
The story starts in the spring of 1966 at the advent of the Cultural Revolution. It opens 
with scenes of the swimming team-mates in the regular drills at Guangzhou University, 
with blurred water images and swimmers’ bodies to foretell the protagonists’ later es-
cape  by swimming through dangerous waters to the coast of Hong Kong. The mod-
ernistic imagery would be reminiscent of thousands of mainlanders who reportedly 
fled China during the Cultural Revolution, many of them failing to make their way in 
the sea with their dead bodies found near the coast.  
Shot on a low budget, the film is reminiscent of Italian neo-realism in deploying ama-
teur actors, location shooting, natural light (with more night scenes) and sound, hand-
held camera, and voice-over. Sung Chuan, a final year medical school student from a 
capitalist family, cannot stand his bleak future and decides to leave China. His voice-
over at the beginning gives a poignant sense of the human stories of his co-conspirators. 
With minimal technical support and skills, the film’s cinematographer Chang Chao-
tang’s black-and-white documentary style helps to reveal “a sense of alienation” and 
“coldness” behind the human dramas (Yau 2004, 74).  
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The narrative is infused with incisive sympathy with the escapees who are torn between 
the ideological fervours of the two (communist and capitalist) worlds. The film ends 
with the protagonists’ successful mission to land in Hong Kong, only to find themselves 
shocked at the city’s contradictory pictures of economic inequality. The couple (Han 
Lun and Sung Lan) reside in a cramped flat on a public housing estate. Han Lun 
becomes a minor clerk at the stock exchange company. Noises of the stock market in 
Hong Kong and sounds of horse-racing are juxtaposed with loudspeaker broadcasts 
of Mao’s political slogans in mainland China. Sung Lan is seemingly suffering from a 
nervous breakdown as seen from her expression of bitter laughter while having her 
hair done in a barber shop. 
China Behind was the first film made by an ethnic Chinese woman film-maker about 
the Cultural Revolution. In the early 1970s, when the Gang of Four was still in power, 
the Cultural Revolution was mythicised as a great achievement of the Chinese people. 
China Behind proved to be Tang’s most courageous and visionary venture to deliver 
her critical view of the political tragedy in China. Whereas pro-communist groups cyn-
ically smeared the film as a “black movie containing poisonous elements to blemish 
the image of China”, Tang defended her work less as a political indictment than as an 
existential inquiry about the human condition in extreme living circumstances. Her 
film “tries to show the frustrations of young people when asked to choose between 
idealism and reality” (Chu 1974). Tang’s broad concern with the human existential 
condition as seen in the plights of the characters was doomed to misapprehension and 
politicisation. 
What did the geopolitics of the Cold War mean to an engaged film-maker and how 
was this manifested? Implicit in Tang’s depoliticised gesture and her reaction to film 
censorship is the identity politics of the Hong Kong film-maker mediated through the 
changes in colonial film policy as the Cold War entered a different stage in the 1970s. 
Supporting the censorial measures on China Behind, the chief censor Lebrun argued 
that the conservative Hong Kong colonial police and legislature in the 1970s was only 
a “reflection” of the dominant conservative escapism in society (Yau 2004, 78). The 
evolution of colonial censorship policies functioned to shape a depoliticised commu-
nity of ethnic Chinese Hong Kong citizens who kept on distancing themselves from 
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contemporary Chinese politics. The postwar youths who were nurtured in Western 
culture and values, however, would have acquired a cultural nostalgia for China. At 
the same time, they did not identify with the undemocratic political systems in the 
mainland and Taiwan, as much as they were resistant to British colonial rule and west-
ern hegemony in Asian countries in the era of decolonisation, the civil rights move-
ment, the anti-Vietnam war movement, and the “Defend Diaoyu Islands” movement.  
In this sense, China Behind was emblematic of the marginalised position of Hong 
Kong vis-à-vis the British colonial and Chinese communist powers. The film’s core 
narrative of Chinese refugees swimming across the border exemplified the border-
crossing experiences of the Hong Kong people, who were mostly migrants from main-
land China. Sarcastically, the moral degeneration and spiritual disillusionment of its 
characters revealed the dehumanising effects felt by people from both sides of the 
border. The film ventured to lay bare the clash of communist and capitalist ideals in 
the protagonists, manifesting the clashes of Cold War ideologies as well as foreshad-
owing Hong Kong people’s identity crisis and their wish to escape from the communist 
authorities and values after the 1997 handover. By emphasising her film’s existential 
concern and moral criticism, Tang defied the sociopolitical context of censorship and 
the interpretation of her film as political advocacy. Her attempts to explore the essen-
tial human condition in the film, and to question how a human being lives and changes 
in a particular socio-economic environment, constituted an idiosyncratic political vi-
sion of a Hong Kong film-maker.   
 
Transnational Censorship: The Coldest Winter in Peking and If I 
Were for Real   
Having elaborated how an independent film-maker dealt with censorial pressures from 
left-wing groups and colonial officials to address the issues of identity politics and film 
aesthetics, this section further explicates how Cold War geopolitics affected the nature 
of trans-border exchange between Hong Kong cinema and Taiwan films. In its prag-
matic diplomacy, Britain maintained a consulate in Taiwan until 1972, following the 
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establishment of an embassy in Beijing. In Hong Kong, the ROC and PRC both main-
tained extensive intelligence networks and commercial links with the colony. To avoid 
political friction on the cultural front, the government continued to grant censors much 
discretion to police Chinese-language films. The investigative report of Frank Ching 
(1987) revealed that since 1973, colonial officials had operated illegal rules to block 
films that depicted China unfavourably, causing public fear of a ‘conspiracy’ between 
the Chinese and Hong Kong governments in constraining Taiwan films in the colony.  
In the same year, 1987, when China Behind was resubmitted to Hong Kong’s censor-
ship board, Taiwan’s state-owned Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC) sim-
ultaneously asked for reclassification of two films —The Coldest Winter in Peking and 
If I Were for Real — as a test. Different from Hong Kong’s independent film China 
Behind, If I Were for Real and The Coldest Winter in Peking were Taiwan-based 
productions that had got on the nerves of Hong Kong film censors when they came 
out in 1981.  
Financed by the state-run CMPC, The Coldest Winter in Peking was made at the 
historical juncture when diplomatic relations between the US and Taiwan had just 
been severed and a wave of patriotism swept the Taiwanese populace (Yau 2015, 180). 
On its public release in Taiwan on 5 February 1981, the film caused a sensation and 
became a box-office smash (Liang 2004, 243). This big-budget production that cost 
about US$ 2 million recruited Taiwan stars to act, including Qin Xianglin 秦祥林, Hu 
Huizhong 胡慧中, Lang Xiong 郎雄, Gui Yalei 歸亞蕾, and Ke Junxiong 柯俊雄. 
Based on the misfortunes of an overseas-trained Chinese scientist, who returns to work 
in China during the Cultural Revolution, the film centers on his tumultuous experi-
ences of broken families and betrayed love.  
The Hong Kong government slapped an immediate ban on the film effective from 
midnight after only one day’s regular showing in town on March 26, 1981. About 17 
theatres mostly in the Shaw Brothers network of movie houses throughout Hong Kong 
were ordered to withdraw the film immediately. It was the first time that the board had 
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banned a film on seemingly political grounds after initially passing it.
2
 Lebrun ex-
plained that his earlier decision to pass the film was because he “interpreted it as an 
entertainment drama based on a series of well-known historical facts”. He thought the 
film was a “Chinese version of Gone with the Wind” (“Filmmakers in Taipei Plan 
Appeal on Ban”), comparable with Dr. Zhivago in terms of its epic scope and senti-
mentalism. But on a second review, Lebrun noticed that “the film has political over-
tones which are liable to be exploited” (Chugani 1981).  
The South China Morning Post (“Officials Brush off Censor Rumpus”) revealed an 
untold story from internal sources. The ban apparently followed representations made 
by Hong Kong-based mainland Chinese officials to the Political Advisor’s Office, 
which called for a second review of the film. The review came to the conclusion that 
Lebrun might have misjudged the film as the reviewing officials expressed “an element 
of surprise that the film was passed for public viewing in the instance”. The officials 
believed that it was true that 90 per cent of the film could be seen as an “entertainment 
drama based on well-known historical facts”; however, the remaining 10 per cent of 
the film was “unambiguous propaganda”, linking what happened during the Cultural 
Revolution to the current leadership in China. One official pointed out the symbolic 
message of “the rising sun of the Nationalist flag”, and was quoted commenting on the 
political overtones as implying: “Look, that’s what had happened during the Cultural 
Revolution, can you trust the present leaders now? Trust the KMT (GMD) instead.” 
These comments allegedly coming from the Political Advisor drove Lebrun to look at 
the film again, resulting in his reversal of his previous judgment all on his own. 
As the news of the ban spread during the evening, crowds of Hong Kong spectators 
flocked to the theatres to see the 9:30 pm and midnight shows. Many of them were 
young people who were curious about the Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution. 
Some expressed disappointment at the government’s move to ban the film as it should 
let people decide for themselves whether the film was biased or not. Older members 
of the audience considered that the ban was brought about because “the Government 
 
2
 The case of The Coldest Winter in Peking was the first time the Film Censorship Board banned a film for political 
reasons after first passing it. It was, however, the third time since 1973 that a film had been withdrawn while being 
screened, but the previous two films’ cases were concerned with explicit sex scenes, namely, Sex on Wheels and 
Erotic Dreams of the Red Chamber. See Leonard 1981. 
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wanted to maintain its good relations with China” (“Sensitive Film Grinds to a Sudden 
Stop”). About 43,000 people reportedly went to see the film’s premiere on that day 
(Leonard 1981). During the showing in the Jade Theatre, it was reported, laughter 
burst out from some of the film-goers who thought the film was exaggerated in some 
of the scenes from what they saw in China. But five out of seven people interviewed 
by a local newspaper thought there was no need for the ban, as the Chinese in Hong 
Kong should have the right to be informed what was happening in China (“Movie Fans 
Hit out at Decision”). 
Apparently, Lebrun’s decision was swayed after strong protests from the New China 
News Agency in Hong Kong. The Chinese representatives were understood to have 
been angry at “the Taiwan treatment of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four 
issues” (Chugani 1981). Before issuing the ban, Lebrun had an emergency meeting 
with Nigel Watt, the Commissioner of TELA. Lebrun added that the film was being 
used and was likely to be further used by certain sections of the media in Hong Kong 
and abroad for propaganda purposes. Taiwan’s CMPC protested against the film ban 
and threatened to launch a lawsuit against the Hong Kong government to obtain com-
pensation for the losses incurred by the film’s distributors through the fault of the 
censors (Leonard 1981). “The decision for censoring the film was obviously politically 
motivated,” Ming Chi of CMPC said, “because Hong Kong authorities examined the 
film at least three times and held numerous discussions before they issued a three-
month license on March 12.” CMPC insisted that the movie itself was strictly “com-
mercial, artistic and factual” rather than political as reassessed by Hong Kong’s film 
censor (“Film Ban Company Threatens Law Suit”). At the same time, CMPC ap-
pealed to the Shaw Brothers Motion Picture Co. to negotiate with the Hong Kong 
government. Movie mogul Sir Run Run Shaw called on Governor Sir Murray 
MacLehose to revoke the ban, but without success. 
Soon after the Film Censorship Board of Review rejected CMPC’s appeal against the 
prohibition of The Coldest Winter in Peking on May 6, the Taiwan film company was 
considering the production of a video cassette tape of the banned film for Hong Kong 
and Southeast Asia. But CMPC hoped to release the tape after the movie had been 
shown in Singapore and Malaysia, in order not to affect the box office takings in the 
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two countries (“Film Ban Appealed”). To beat the ban in Hong Kong, Taiwan 
promptly campaigned for tourist and film-going events in Taipei targeting the Hong 
Kong people and overseas Chinese audiences. The Taipei First Hotel offered free 
rooms and cinema tickets for Hong Kong tourists to fly to Taipei to see the film. The 
Hong Kong visitors were all given two-day-one-night complimentary accommodation 
plus free tickets to watch the show. The Taiwan authorities allegedly sped up issuing 
visas “tremendously” to help Hong Kong people join the tour (“Firm Takes Film Ban 
Fight to Appeals Board”). All of the theatre’s 1,000 seats were reportedly filled at each 
showing, and the audience included an average of 400 overseas Chinese and 50 West-
ern visitors a day. CMPC and the Taipei hotel owner claimed that their organised 
“protest activities” were not publicity gimmicks but were actuated by “a strong sense 
of patriotism”. They were “simply dedicated to the cause of anti-communism—and 
nothing else” (“Taiwan Tries to Get Ban Lifted”).  
Significantly, the issues of transnational screening, trans-media politics (film and video), 
and propaganda campaigns were crucial to the controversy over this Taiwan film about 
the Cultural Revolution. After Mao’s death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, 
the Cultural Revolution officially came to an end. Nonetheless, political tensions per-
sisted between the PRC and the ROC. As Taiwan was under the reign of martial law 
(1949–1987) with propagandistic promotion of anti-communism in the early 1980s, 
the transnational Cold War politics still troubled colonial censors and their political 
advisors in making cultural policy decisions. They consistently ignored the voices of 
Hong Kong film-makers and audiences and deprived them of their rights to consume 
Chinese story-telling on screen. The press coverage of the Hong Kong spectators tes-
tified to the fact that young citizens were eager to know about the Cultural Revolution 
and contemporary China, while the general audience did not necessarily take the film 
as mere propaganda.  
Whereas Cold War politics unfolded as the intricate intertwining of proxy cultural 
wars, espionage, diplomatic manoeuvreing, and media campaigns in the cinematic cir-
cuits of Hong Kong and Taiwan, the way in which its local experiences were mani-
fested in everyday life is worth scrutiny. Implicit in this line of questioning is the nature 
of intercultural exchange in film-making and reception as they are mediated through 
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the politics of film censorship. If I Were for Real was a transcultural production in-
volving a Taiwanese screen adaptation of a Shanghainese play based on a nineteenth-
century Russian drama, enhanced in commercial value by Mandopop music and Can-
topop film stardom. The film was adapted by director Wang Tong from a 1979 Chi-
nese satirical play in six acts written by Shanghai-based playwright Sha Yexin 沙葉新. 
The play was inspired by the March 1979 arrest of Zhang Quanlong 張泉龍, a young 
man who impersonated the son of Li Da 李達, deputy head of the People’s Liberation 
Army General Staff Department. While the Chinese film title was adopted from Te-
resa Teng’s famous Mandopop album, the story was also inspired by Nikolai Gogol’s 
satirical play The Inspector General (1836), rewritten by Sha Yexin into a play about 
a Chinese swindler to expose the corruption of communist officialdom. 
At the end of the 1970s, Li Xiaozhang 李小璋 (Alan Tam/Tan Yonglun 譚詠倫), a 
26-year-old sent-down youth at a state farm, is frustrated as he cannot obtain a transfer 
to the city. His pregnant girlfriend Zhou Minghua 周明華 has already returned to the 
city. Without his securing the transfer, her father will not let them marry. Realising that 
tickets to a popular play (Nikolai Gogol’s The Government Inspector, about an im-
postor) are unavailable to commoners but reserved for cadre members and their fam-
ilies, he poses as the son of a high-level cadre to gain entrance to the play. Soon many 
cadres and high communist officials all fawn over him in the belief that he will in return 
use his connections for their selfish gains. Li enjoys a privileged life for some time 
during his stay in Shanghai, and almost succeeds in receiving his transfer. His imper-
sonation is exposed in the end and he is brought to trial. Admitting his guilt, he poign-
antly reminds the audience that if he were really this son taking bribes from fawning 
underlings—“if I were for real”— everything would have been completely legal and ac-
cepted. It is the impersonation but not corruption itself that is the crime. 
The original Shanghai-based play was produced in August 1979 by the Shanghai Peo-
ple’s Art Theatre. The play exposed corruption in the establishment and lampooned 
the impostor’s “victims”. After a brief run in a few major cities, the mainland authori-
ties imposed a ban on its public performance. In January 1980 Hu Yaobang gave the 
order to halt the performance of the play (Fong 1987, 213). In the same month, the 
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text of the play, which had been issued in China only as a restricted circulation publi-
cation, was “smuggled” to Hong Kong and published in The Seventies (Qishi Niandai
七十年代), a Hong Kong magazine. The screen adaptation in Taiwan turned the sa-
tirical comedy into a political drama to condemn Chinese communism. Probably for 
political reasons, the movie won the Golden Horse Awards in 1981 including Best 
Feature Film, Best Actor (Alan Tam), and Best Adapted Screenplay (Chang Yung-
hsiang). It was selected as the Taiwanese entry for the Academy Award for Best For-
eign Language Film at the 54th Academy Awards, but it failed in the nomination.  
At issue here is the use of the story for different political purposes. In the Shanghai 
stage version, Li Da takes pity on the impostor and speaks up for him, blaming his 
actions on the Gang of Four’s policy of sending urban youth down to the countryside 
and on cadres for their toadying behaviour. The Taiwan film adaptation underwent 
some major dramatic changes to augment its criticism of human nature and the cor-
ruption of Chinese society. The film disregarded some of the “inherent ambiguities in 
the play” to sharpen its condemnation of communism (Fong 1987, 233–53).
3
 For in-
stance, the film introduces a licentious and corrupt character Wang Yun, deputy 
mayor of Shanghai, who keeps an innocent actress as his mistress, thus strengthening 
the negative impression associated with the ruling elite in mainland China. In the film, 
Zhou Minghua’s pregnancy is revealed much earlier than in the play. As a result, the 
opportunistic prankster Li Xiaozhang is portrayed, in a positive light, as a hero fighting 
for the survival of his future family. The play ends with Li Xiaozhang on trial and Zhou 
Minghua in the hospital. In the film, Zhou Minghua drowns herself (and her unborn 
baby), while Li Xiaozhang cuts his wrist and inscribes with his blood the words “If I 
Were for Real” on the cell wall before his death. The main characters do not kill 
themselves in the end in the original play.  
In Hong Kong, TELA issued a ban on the film on August 25, 1981, saying the film 
“is likely to be used as propaganda and not in the interest of Hong Kong” (“Taiwan 
Movie Banned”). Lebrun insisted that the ban was an independent decision of the 
censorship authorities without any intervention from the New China News Agency. “I 
 
3
 For an analysis of the play and adaptation, see Barmé 1983, 319–32; for a translation of the play, see Sha, Li, and 
Yao 1983, 198–250. 
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don’t think Hong Kong can afford to have polemics between groups of different ide-
ologies,” Lebrun noted, implying that the decision was made to steer clear of potential 
conflicts between Taiwan and the PRC (“Film Censorship” 1981–1982).  
The Coldest Winter in Peking and If I Were for Real were resubmitted to the censor 
board of Hong Kong in 1987, but the ban on the two films was not lifted until 1989. 
The Coldest Winter in Peking was submitted for censorship on 7 June, 1989, that is 
the third day after the June Fourth Massacre that marked an end to the 1989 Democ-
racy Movement begun in April 1989; the government censors approved the film, and 
the film was released again in Hong Kong on 22 June, 1989. If I Were for Real also 
successfully passed the censor board and was released on 4 May, 1989, before June 
Fourth (Yau 2015, 180–1). Were the resubmissions of these two films based on an 
opportunistic business motive? The democratic student movement in Beijing in 1989 
certainly alarmed Hong Kong citizens about their uncertain future after 1997, which 
would have fueled public interest in seeing the two films about the Cultural Revolution 
and its aftermath. What was the government’s political motive for allowing the two 
provocative films to be publicly screened?
4
 Political speculation has indicated the on-
going Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong, as Britain could gain 
more bargaining power by stirring up public opinion against communist China (Yau 
2015, 181).   
The two controversial Taiwan-related film cases attest to the dynamics of transnational 
Cold War politics, in which the changing political climates and shifting audience re-
ceptions were crucially tied up with the historical relationships of colonial Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and mainland China. In view of the overt political anti-communist messages 
of the films as understood by colonial censors within a larger geopolitical framing, what 
is noteworthy is how local audiences could read the manifold meanings of the films as 
imaginative story-telling. The two films can be read as exposés of political catastrophes 
and human suffering to denounce the socialist system. Yet they also reach beyond the 
surface of political accusations. The emotional treatment of tragic romances and 
 
4
 The author personally got to view the two films in commercial theatres in the summer of 1989, as he recalls, a few 
weeks after the Tiananmen tragedy in Beijing. The author has yet to gain permission to access confidential documents 
to understand how the censors passed the two films, which were previously prohibited, in the changing sociopolitical 
circumstances in 1989. 
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thwarted human relationships in the films deliver a new interpretation of the work of 
“Scar Literature” with profound humanism. At once political and thought-provoking, 
the two films probe issues of individuality and human freedom when powerless indi-
viduals are opposing and protesting against the inhuman political system as a whole.  
 
Reflections 
This study draws on primary research from colonial archives and press coverage to 
unveil the behind-the-scenes history of Hong Kong film censorship. It reveals the prac-
tice of colonial censorial constraints on screen exhibition in relation to the trans-border 
exchange of film productions between Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China at the height 
of Cold War paranoia. It observes a shift in the British censorship in the 1970s and 
1980s regarding mainland films and the representation of China in films. Having con-
ducted adequate research on the censorship-related cases and untold stories, the study 
attempts to contextualise the film censorship policy regarding the geopolitics of the 
Cold War in Asia, in particular Britain’s diplomatic negotiations with China and Tai-
wan, to understand how the cultural Cold War was played out in East Asia, and par-
ticularly the vital role of the Hong Kong film scene.   
The study interrogates how the relentlessly changing practices and apparatuses of co-
lonial censorship can illuminate the local politics of Hong Kongese officers in re-
sponse to the ever-adjusting policies, and ponders the identity politics of the citizen 
audience in reaction to official censorial measures. The controversial cases have 
demonstrated the vulnerability of the censorship system to international politics that 
shaped erratic official decisions in dealing with the changing Cold War situation. Brit-
ish-style pragmatism and managerial expediency were most acutely manifested in how 
flexibly—and sometimes awkwardly—Hong Kong officials handled thorny issues and 
social crises arising from the danger of exhibiting controversial films and propagandist 
newsreels imported from mainland China and Taiwan in this period. I believe that the 
proclaimed political ethics of “even-handedness”, which the colonial authorities invar-
iably used to justify their positions and objectives of playing a fair game between the 
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PRC and ROC regimes, may be simplistic and crafty excuses for colonial decision-
makers.   
Arguably, Hong Kong censors could have maintained some degree of cultural auton-
omy in adjusting censorship policies vis-à-vis both British rule and the propaganda war 
between the PRC and Taiwan in this period (Du 2017, 117). What is most revealing 
and fascinating, however, is how local film-makers and audiences countered the cen-
sorship policy to negotiate a local identity in everyday life. Tang Shu-shuen’s tactic of 
screening China demonstrates how a creative film-maker moved beyond the ideologi-
cal divides and deployed cinematic story-telling to articulate a notion of contested Chi-
nese identity that was different from the Cold War rhetoric of anticommunism or 
Chinese patriotism. This questioning of Chineseness, which cannot simply be reduced 
to political allegiances, was ambiguously expressed by the Hong Kongese audience in 
their move against the ban on viewing prohibited films with the tabooed subject of the 
Cultural Revolution. Such illuminating cases offer us new insights that censorship stud-
ies is not so much about prohibiting, silencing, or erasing memories of a populace as 
about producing and creating new forms of memories of the past and expressions of 
local identities in flux.  
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